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Abstract
International patenting is increasing in importance. Patents protection is sought 
in the inventors’ homeland but increasingly also in other countries. Globaliza-
tion, high growth rates in high-tech industries, growing emerging markets and 
harmonization of patent institutions across countries have stimulated increased 
international patenting. We use a simple model of international patenting de-
veloped by Eaton and Kortum(1996) where the decision to patent in a country 
depends on country characteristics and the quality of the patented invention. 
With access to a unique database on Swedish firms’ patents and patent behavior 
we are able to estimate some of these relations and test their validity. Our results 
indicate that the propensity to apply for international patent protection increases 
with indicators of the value of the invention and indictors of technological ri-
valry and market size in the markets where patent applications are submitted.  
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1. Introduction 
Single patents do not provide protection in all countries and single in-
ventions have to be patented in the countries (or group of countries) 
where protection is sought. A patent in a specific country protects the 
inventor from imitators producing in that country and from outside 
imitators selling there. Therefore protection of intellectual property 
rights increases with the number of patent equivalents, i.e. parallel pa-
tents for a single invention in several regions and countries. Patent 
protection is costly. Therefore, the decision to seek patent protection 
in a given country reflects a tradeoff between gains and costs. Gener-
ally protection of intellectual property rights is sought only in some 
countries. 
 
During the last decades, there has been a trend towards strengthening 
and harmonization of patent institutions across nations and regions. 
International patenting is increasing in importance and by 2010 more 
than 40 per cent of all patent applications in world’s patent offices are 
from non-residents. Around 50 percent of the patents granted in the 
U.S. and Europe are nowadays owned by foreign firms and inventors 
(Lévêque and Ménière 2004). Still, most patents are patented in one or 
a few (groups of) countries only.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the international patenting 
strategy of small firms and inventors. We have access to a unique da-
tabase on Swedish small firms’ and inventors’ patenting behavior. 
That data base contains information on patenting in Sweden, patent 
equivalents in other countries and a number of variables reflecting the 
economic value of the patents, commercialization success and charac-
teristics of the firms and the inventors. The study is explorative in na-
ture. Therefore we first show descriptive statistics on international pa-
tenting. Thereafter, the database we use is presented together with 
some simple statistical tests. In section 4 we present a simple model 
for international patenting where the probability of patenting an inven-
tion from one country in another country is related to characteristics of 
the invention and indicators of its value and indicators of the market 
where patent protection is sought, like market size, growth rates and 
distance from the country of origin (Sweden). We estimate parameters 
of the model and find that the results are in accordance with the mod-
el’s predictions.  
 
   
 
2. International patenting 
International patenting has been facilitated for long.  In the early stag-
es of the history of intellectual property rights, discrimination between 
nationals and foreigners were frequent (see e.g. Scotchmer, 2004). 
Since the Paris convention was signed in 1883, foreign patent appli-
cants (from other contracting states) were granted the same treatment 
as national applicants. Thereafter, national patent regulations still dif-
fered (and to some extents dramatically) but they rested on national 
treatment also of foreigners. With the establishment of the TRIPS 
(Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement in the WTO 
from 1995, dramatic steps toward harmonization and standardization 
of patent regulations have been made. That agreement imposes mini-
mum requirements for patent institutions and patent regulations regu-
lations on member countries.1 According to Hoekman and Kostecki 
(1995) “the TRIPS agreement is unique in the WTO context in that it 
imposes obligations upon governments to pursue specific, similar pol-
icies.” The TRIPS agreement has resulted in fairly harmonized patent 
institutions across countries. Patent institutions are still national (or 
regional, for instance in the case of Europe), but their design is now 
regulated by the TRIPS agreement and they provide similar and har-
monized treatment of national and foreigners.2  
 
Some differences of the patent regimes across regions remain. Japan, 
Europe and the USA have the largest patent institutions internationally 
(in terms of the number of patents). Traditionally the three systems 
(although in Europe there were many), differed according to national 
priorities.3 In recent years, they have converged considerably. In Eu-
                                                 
1  Multilateral co-operation in the field of intellectual property rights was extended after the 
Paris convention with increasing numbers of member states and a number of new agree-
ments. The agreement on copyrights (the Bern-convention, 1886), the Madrid conventions 
against false origin (1891), the universal copyright convention (1952), the Rome conven-
tion (1961) on protection of neighboring rights and the IPIC treaty (1989) on intellectual 
property in respect of integrated circuits extend and harmonize IPR internationally. Most 
of these multilateral treaties on intellectual property rights are administrated by the World 
Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO) located in Geneva. The TRIPS agree-
ment is administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Maskus (2000) provides 
an overview of  intellectual property rights in the world economy. OECD (2004) discuss 
trends and policy challenges in the world’s patent system.  In Hoekman and Kostecki 
(1995)  the road from GATT to the WTO (and the TRIPS) is discussed and analysed. For 
a critical discussion about reforms in the US patent system, see Jaffe and Lerner (2004).  
2  There are many exceptions to the general statement above. In particular, exemptions are 
granted developing countries and countries are free to extend intellectual property rights 
protections.  Developing countries in general resisted introduction of intellectual property 
rights into the world trade policy systems. See Hoekman and Kostecki (1995) or Maskus 
(2000) for a discussion.  
3  For instance, before 1988 Japanese patents could only include one claim per patent in 
contrast to Eurpean and U.S. patent which could include multiple claims. Therefore, U.S. 
and European patents were more open for legal interpretation of their scope However, in 
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rope and Japan, the “first to file” the patent application will get the 
patent right. In the U.S., the “first to invent” will get the patent. If a 
firm files a patent and is granted the patent right, another firm, which 
have invented first, can regain the right over the patent (Harison 
2008). Thus, the validity and novelty of the patent can be challenged 
in all regions, but the ownership right of the patent application can on-
ly be challenged in the U.S.4 This means that the risk of filing patents 
is higher in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan.5 
 
Another difference is that the European patent system is much more 
fragmented than the U.S. and Japanese patent systems (van Pottels-
berghe 2009 and 2010 and van Pottelsberghe and Francois, 2006). The 
costs for EPO-patents are considerably higher. After a patent is grant-
ed by EPO, the patentee can decide in which country to validate the 
patent. The patent must be translated to the national language of the 
countries where the inventor wishes to get a patent right. These trans-
lation costs are significant. Renewal fees must be paid in every single 
EPO member country. There is no unitary European litigation court. 
Especially high-value patents are subject for litigation. If there are 
parallel litigations in different European countries, the outcome can be 
divergent (upholding or invalidating a patent). At the moment, the EU 
commission has submitted a proposal of a single European patent 
which only needs to be translated to three languages (English, French 
and German) and where litigation would be decided at a unitary Euro-
pean court. However, several EU-authorities must approve this pro-
posal. 
 
If a patent is granted by EPO, the national patent offices always have 
to follow this decision. But if the EPO-patent is rejected or if no EPO-
patent is filed, the inventor has always the possibility to get a patent in 
an individual EPO-member state if the patent is filed directly at the 
national patent office within the “priority year”. 
 
During the 1970s patenting relative to R&D decreased. This was so 
for several industrialized countries and for the USA in particular. Both 
resident and non-resident patent applications relative to R&D de-
creased. For the USA also the absolute number of resident patent ap-
plications decreased. In figure 1 these developments for the US are 
                                                 
1988 the scope of Japanese patents became broader and several claims could be included 
in a single patent. Before 2000, U.S. patents were not published until they were granted. 
Therefore, knowledge disclosure occurred later for U.S. patents than for patents from oth-
er countries. In 2000, this rule changed and publication now occurs 18 months after the 
patent is filed. As a result, knowledge diffusion now starts earlier for U.S. patents and 
similar to European patents. 
4  An exception that the patent ownership can be challenged outside the U.S. is if an em-
ployee steals a non-patented invention (theft of firm secrecy) from his firm and then files 
a patent for the invention. The firm can then claim “better right” and can get the owner-
ship of the patent.  
5  A consequence is that the social welfare might be lower in the U.S. as applications are 
delayed and know-how is not disclosed (Dasqupta 1988). 
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illustrated. Many economists feared that R&D had entered a phase of 
decreasing returns and low rates of productivity growth at the same 
time increased pessimism.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Source: WIPO 
 
From figure 1 it is obvious that this pessimism, at least when primi-
tively read off from data for patent applications, was not well founded. 
From the mid-1980s onwards patenting surged. Both national and 
non-resident patent applications increased. For the world economy, 
the number of patent families (i.e. the number of patented inventions, 
inclusive of their patent equivalents) has increased. This is illustrated 
in figure 2.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Source: WIPO 
 
Figure 2 shows the total number of patent families for all countries 
and for those originating in the USA. The figure demonstrates a global 
and strong increase in patenting since 1994 onwards.  
 
Figure 1 illustrated that patent applications from non-residents in the 
US has increased in parallel with domestic patent applications. This is 
also the case for non-resident patent applications in other countries. 
Figure 3 shows developments for all countries, for the USA and Japan 
and for US and Japanese patents in EPO.6  
 
These figures indicate that non-resident patenting has kept a stable 
share of total patenting for the major economies while international 
patenting is on increase for the world economy in total. This seems to 
have occurred independently of the TRIPS agreement in the WTO. In 
figure 3 there is no break in aggregate time series for global interna-
tional patenting in 1995, when the TRIPS agreement came into force.  
 
                                                 
6  Figures are different for the European Patent Office since the member countries change 
over time. Therefore, internationalization is demonstrated most clearly with the use of 
large outside countries.  
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Figure 3 
 
 
Source: WIPO 
 
There was a debate among economists on decreasing trends in patent-
ing in the 1970s and 1980s.7 Zvi Griliches (1989) pointed at institu-
tional weaknesses in the patent system to explain the falling trend. 
Subsequent institutional reforms (both in the US, in Europe, in other 
countries and multilaterally) may lend support to Griliches’ view. 
Samuel Kortum (1993), on the other side, has argued that develop-
ments in the number of patent applications (both from residents and 
non residents) can be explained by economic developments. He has 
argued that accelerated economic integration from the 1990s onwards 
has increased market sizes for new technologies and therefore profita-
bility from innovation. The effects of patent institutional reform and 
the TRIPS agreement from 1995 onwards are still up for debate.  
 
Our discussion above indicates that international patenting is of great 
importance as compared to national patenting. International patenting 
has been the subject for a few analyses. A classic reference is Evenson 
(1984). That contribution is a descriptive discussion of trends in inter-
national patenting (based on rather limited data). Evenson reaches two 
main conclusions. The first is that his (by now) historical data show 
                                                 
7  The pros and cons of using patent statistics as an economic indicator are well known. (see 
e.g. Griliches, 1990). All inventions do not result in patents and the propensity to patent 
vary between technologies, industries and even countries. The access to easily read and 
clear microdata is the main advantage of using patentdata rather than data on innovations. 
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comparative advantage patterns in invention similar to patterns ob-
served in countries’ production. Thus knowledge production is con-
centrated in economies with comparative advantages in high tech in-
dustries. Second, Evenson provides support for the pessimistic view 
(at that time) that the number of inventions per scientists was on a de-
clining trend in the early 1980s. More recent contributions are Putnam 
(1996) and Lanjouw et al. (1996). Also see Harhoff et al. (2009).  
 
3.  Database and descriptive statistics 
We use a detailed data set on patents granted to small firms (less than 
1000 employees) and individual inventors. The data set is based on a 
survey conducted in 2003-04 on Swedish patents granted in 1998. In 
that year, 1082 patents were granted to Swedish small firms and indi-
viduals.8 Information about inventors, applying firms and their ad-
dresses as well as application dates for each patent, was received from 
the Swedish Patent and Registration Office (PRV). Thereafter, a ques-
tionnaire was sent out to the inventors of the patents.
9
 867 (out of 
1082) inventors filled in and returned the questionnaire, i.e., the re-
sponse rate was 80 percent. The falling off is not systematic with re-
spect to IPC-classes or geographical regions.10 The response rate is 
satisfactorily high, given that such a database has seldom been col-
lected before and that inventors or applying firms normally consider 
information about inventions and patents confidential. 
 
The questionnaire asked the inventors about the work place where the 
invention was created, if and when the invention had been commer-
cialized, which kind of commercialization mode was chosen, the prof-
itability of the commercialization, and some more information. The 
data set was later complemented with data on patent renewal, interna-
tional patents and forward citations from the Espacenet (2010) web-
site. 
 
In Sweden and most other countries, patent owners must pay an annu-
al renewal fee to the relevant patent office in order to keep their pa-
tents in force. The patent expires if the renewal fee is not paid in any 
single year. Thus, the patent owner has an option to renew the patent 
                                                 
8  In 1998, 2760 patents were granted in Sweden. 776 of these were granted to foreign firms, 
902 to large Swedish firms with more than 1000 employees, and 1082 to Swedish indi-
viduals or firms with less than 1000 employees. In a pilot survey carried out in 2002, it 
turned out that large Swedish firms refused to provide information on individual patents. 
Furthermore, it proved very difficult to persuade foreign firms to answer fill-in question-
naires about patents. These firms are almost always large multinationals firms. The sam-
ple selection in our data is not a problem however, as long as the conclusions are drawn 
for small firms and individuals located in Sweden. 
9  Each patent always has at least one inventor and often an applying firm as well. The in-
ventors or the applying firm can be the owner of the patent, but the inventors can also 
own the patent indirectly, via the applying firm. Sometimes, the inventors are employed 
in the applying firm, which owns the patent. If the patent had more than one inventor, the 
questionnaire was sent to only one of the inventors. 
10  Of the 20% non-respondents, 10% of the inventors had outdated addresses, 5% had cor-
rect addresses but did not respond, and the remaining 5% refused to participate. The only 
information we have about the non-respondents is the IPC-class of the patent and the re-
gion of the inventors. For these variables, there was no systematic difference between re-
spondents and non-respondents. 
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every year.11 The option for further renewal is acquired by renewing 
the patent at each mandatory date. In our dataset an indicator variable 
(ALIVE) express whether the patent has been renewed until the time 
the data were collected or whether it had lapsed.  
 
The 867 patents in the database has together 1 733 patent equivalents 
in other countries, i.e. almost exactly two equivalents per patent. But 
only 335 (39 %) out of the 867 patents in the data set have any patent 
equivalents at all. This means that given that a Swedish patent has any 
equivalents, the average number of equivalents per patent is 5.2. The 
frequency distribution (log scale) of patent equivalents (plus one – to 
account for zeros) is graphed in figure 4. It is seen that the distribution 
is highly skewed with a preponderance of zeros and small numbers. 
The maximum number of equivalents for a given patent is 24. These 
numbers include EPO as one observation. Thus, the maximum number 
of equivalents in individual countries is 23.  
 
Figure 4 
 
 
                                                 
11  A patent can only expire at a fixed date every year, on the anniversary of the original ap-
plication date. In 1999, the size of the renewal fees was increasing annually, ranging from 
200 SEK in the first year to 4 300 SEK in the last year, adding up to total of about 35 000 
SEK over 20 years (One EUR is approximately 8 SEK). The Swedish renewal fees are 
modest compared to those for EPO and American patents (van Pottelsberghe and Francois 
(2006). According to Van Pottelsberghe and Francois (2006), the total cost for a patent 
which is renewed for 20 years is EUR 120 000 (40 000) in 13 (3) EPO member states, 
EUR 14 500 in the U.S. and EUR 17 300 in Japan. These costs include procedural costs 
(official costs up to the grant date) and external services that the inventor/firm needs when 
filing the patent. EPO patents are much more expensive due to high translation costs – the 
granted patent must be translated and validated in each targeted national patent office. The 
other reason why EPO patents are more expensive is higher annual renewal fees (which 
vary with the duration of the protection). The authors show that renewal fees for 20 years 
in the EPO system are EUR 89 000 (22 000) in 13 (3) member states, whereas this cost is 
considerably lower in the U.S. and Japan. However, the renewal fees in single European 
countries like Sweden are of a modest amount. 
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In total there are patent equivalents in 36 countries (including EPO). 
As will become clear from the analysis in section 5 below, patent 
equivalents are not distributed randomly across those countries. Figure 
5 shows the correlation between the average number of patent equiva-
lents (horizontal axis) and the occurrence in the different countries. 
For instance, patent equivalents occur 224 times in the USA. The 
mean number of patent equivalents for an invention with a patent 
equivalent in the USA is 5.8. A patent with an equivalent in Estonia 
(or Romania) occurred only once. This had 24 equivalents (both for 
the Estonian and the Romanian cases). The graph displays a negative 
correlation. This means that those countries that are seldom chosen for 
patent applications occur mostly when also other countries are chosen.  
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
224 Swedish patents in the data set had equivalents in the U.S. and 
217 had an EPO-patent. The EPO-patent must then be filed in individ-
ual countries. The EPO-patents resulted in 1106 individual patents in 
the EPO-member countries, i.e. on average 5.1 individual patents per 
EPO-patent. The EPO-patents are filed most frequently in Germany, 
Great Britain and France – the large EPO-countries. In the third main 
area, Japan, the Swedish patents had 141 equivalents. 
 
The database contains information about firm size and type of the pa-
tentee. This information was categorized into four main types, medi-
um sized firms (101-1000 employees), small firms (11-100), micro 
firms (2-10 employees) and individual inventors (no employees). The 
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database also contains information about renewal of patents (measured 
by ALIVE, as mentioned).  
 
In addition, we use information about forward patent citations. Patent 
documents contain references to existing patents. These references 
serve to delimit the scope of patent protection. Often it is assumed that 
these references indicate the type of knowledge that the citing patent 
extends or build on. There literature on patent citations show that such 
citations are indicators of patents’ private and social value (see e.g. 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). Generally this literature suggests that 
patents that are frequently cited by subsequent patents have a higher 
private and social value than other patents. Maurseth (2005) suggests 
that forward citations within narrowly defined technology classes may 
indicate new rival knowledge vis-à-vis the cited patent. Forward cita-
tions across technology classes, on the other hand, may indicate that 
the cited patent was a scientific or technologically breakthrough, and 
therefore that the cited patent may both have higher social and private 
values than other patents.  
 
But whether or not patented inventions are commercialized and 
brought to market differ. Many patents fail in the commercialization 
process while some becomes successful. Some patents may not be 
commercialized however, but are kept alive as a buffer against rivals’ 
potential market entries. Some inventions may be commercialized 
without being patented.12 
 
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show partial relationships between the number of 
patent equivalents and firm types, patent renewal, the number of pa-
tent citations and the commercialization decision, respectively.  
 
The international patenting strategy across firm sizes is shown in Ta-
ble 1. In the sample, 116 patents is owned by medium-sized firms 
(101-1000 employees), 201 by small firms (11-100), 142 by micro 
companies (2-10 employees) and 408 by individual inventors. Firms 
have considerably more patent equivalents than individual inventors. 
This is expected, since international patenting is costly. For example, 
54 % of the medium-sized firms in the sample had an equivalent in at 
least one of the three main areas (USA, EPO and Japan), whereas only 
27 % of the individual inventors had chosen such a strategy. The dif-
ferences in patent equivalents across firm groups are mostly signifi-
cant using chi-square tests, except for the case of patent equivalents in 
all three main areas. 
 
                                                 
12  Non-patented inventions are obviously not covered by our database, however.  
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Table 1. International patenting across firm groups. No. of patents 
and percent. 
 
Firm groups Medium-
sized firms 
(101-1000 
employees) 
Small firms 
(11-100 
employees) 
Micro com-
panies 
(2-10 
employees) 
Individual in-
ventors 
(no employees) 
 
All patents 
 
Chi-
square 
test  
No. of patents 116 201 142 408 867 ------ 
Patents in 3  main 
areas 
17 
(15 %) 
22 
(11 %) 
12 
(8 %) 
28 
(7 %) 
79 
(9 %) 
7.7 * 
Patents in at least 
2 main areas 
30 
(26 %) 
45 
(22 %) 
41 
(29 %) 
76 
(19 %) 
192 
(22 %) 
9.7 ** 
Patents in at least 
1 main area 
63 
(54 %) 
76 
(38 %) 
62 
(44 %) 
110 
(27 %) 
311 
(36 %) 
35.3 *** 
Any international 
patent 
66 
(57 %) 
87 
(43 %) 
66 
(46 %) 
116 
(28 %) 
335 
(39 %) 
39.7 *** 
Average No. of 
patents 
2.54 2.10 2.44 1.64 2.00 ------ 
 
Note: The three main areas are EPO, USA and Japan. ***, ** and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2. International patents and survival of patents. No. of pa-
tents and percent. 
 
 Renewed in 2004 
All patents 
Chi-square 
test Yes No 
No. of patents 482 385 867 ------ 
Patents in 3 main 
areas 
68 
(14 %) 
  11 
(3 %) 
79 
  (9 %) 
  32.7 *** 
Patents in at least 2 
areas 
159 
(33 %) 
  33 
(9 %) 
192 
(22 %) 
  74.0 *** 
Patents in at least 1 
area 
232 
(48 %) 
79 
(21 %) 
311 
(36 %) 
  70.9 *** 
EPO-patent 185 
(38 %) 
32   
(8 %) 
217 
(25 %) 
103.1 *** 
US-patent 167 
(35 %) 
57 
(15 %) 
224 
(26 %) 
  44.0 *** 
Japan-patent 107 
(22 %) 
34   
(9 %) 
141 
(16 %) 
  28.1 *** 
Average No. of 
countries 
3.09 0.63 2.00 ------ 
 
Note: The three main areas are EPO, USA and Japan. ***, ** and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
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In Table 2, international patents are compared to the renewal of pa-
tents. Here, we expect a positive relationship, since both renewal and 
international patenting should be related to the private value of a pa-
tent. Patent renewal behavior has been investigated in many articles 
and patent renewal has often been used to infer about the private value 
(distributions) of patents.13 Patents which were still alive in 2004 had 
considerably more often equivalents than expired ones. For example 
33 % of the patents still alive in 2004 had equivalents in at least two 
of the three main areas, but only 9 % of the expired patents. The chi-
square tests of independence between groups are never lower than 28 
which is very high, since the threshold value for 1 percent significance 
is 6.3 
 
 
Table 3. International patents and forward citations. No. of pa-
tents and percent. 
 
 Forward citations 
All patents Chi-square test 
Yes No 
No. of patents 350 517 867 ------ 
Patents in 3 main areas 73 
(21 %) 
  6 
(1 %) 
79 
  (9 %) 
  97.8 *** 
Patents in at least 2 areas 159 
(45 %) 
33 
(6 %) 
192 
(22 %) 
184.6 *** 
Patents in at least 1 area 252 
(72 %) 
63 
(12 %) 
311 
(36 %) 
493.4 *** 
Patents in none of the 
three main areas 
98 
(28 %) 
454 
(88 %) 
556 
(74 %) 
EPO-patent 181 
(52 %) 
36   
(15 %) 
217 
(25 %) 
222.7 *** 
US-patent 185 
(53 %) 
39 
(7 %) 
224 
(26 %) 
223.6 *** 
Japan-patent 114 
(33 %) 
27   
(5 %) 
141 
(16 %) 
114.6 *** 
Average No. of countries 4.00 0.64 2.00 ------ 
 
Note: The three main areas are EPO, USA and Japan. ***, ** and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
 
When relating international patenting to forward citations in Table 3, 
the positive relationship is even stronger. Patents with forward cita-
tions had 4.0 patent equivalents on average compared to 0.64 for pa-
tents without equivalents. 72 % of the cited patents had equivalents in 
at least 1 main area, but only 12 % of the non-cited ones, etc. Or from 
                                                 
13  See e.g. Pakes and Schankerman (1984), Pakes (1986), Pakes and Simpson (1989), 
Schankerman (1998) and  Schankerman and Pakes (1986).  
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another point of view, 81 % (252 out of 311) of the patents with 
equivalents in at least 1 main area are cited, whereas only 18 % (98 
out of 556) of the patents with no equivalents any main area are cited. 
Forward citations are considered as a measure on the social value of 
patents. One reason for this is that patents that are cited in subsequent 
patents’ patent documents are considered as basic inventions which 
are useful for development of new knowledge. Many studies have also 
indicated higher private value of patents with many forward citations 
(see e.g. Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). Thus, a positive correlation be-
tween the number of patent equivalents and the number of forward 
citations is as expected. In addition however, there may be other rea-
sons why this correlation is so high:  
 
The citations are mostly added by independent patent examiners at the 
patent offices. The explanation for the high correlation between the 
number patent citations and the number of equivalents could be that 
when a Swedish patent has equivalents in EPO, Japan or the U.S., the 
patent is much more visible for patent examiners. This will increase 
the probability that the patent is cited even if the patent citations do 
not signal higher values of the cited patent.  
 
 
Table 4. International patents and commercialization. No. of pa-
tents and percent. 
 
 Commercialization 
All patents 
Chi-square 
test Yes No 
No. of patents 526 341 867 ------ 
Patents in 3 main areas 60 
(11 %) 
  19 
(6 %) 
79 
  (9 %) 
  8.5 *** 
Patents in at least 2 areas 146 
(28 %) 
  46 
(13 %) 
192 
(22 %) 
24.4 *** 
Patents in at least 1 area 233 
(48 %) 
78 
(23 %) 
311 
(36 %) 
41.3 *** 
EPO-patent 165 
(44 %) 
52   
(15 %) 
217 
(25 %) 
28.6 *** 
US-patent 168 
(32 %) 
56 
(16 %) 
224 
(26 %) 
26.0 *** 
Japan-patent 106 
(20 %) 
35   
(10 %) 
141 
(16 %) 
14.9 *** 
Average No. of countries 2.62 1.04 2.00 ------ 
 
Note: The three main areas are EPO, USA and Japan. ***, ** and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
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In Table 4, international patenting is related to commercialization. 
Here, we also expect a positive relationship, since more valuable pa-
tents should both have more equivalents and be commercialized with a 
higher probability. The descriptive statistics give support to this view. 
The chi-square tests strongly rejects that there is independence be-
tween commercialization and equivalents. Commercialized patents 
have more frequently patent equivalents than non-commercialized 
ones. For example, 48 and 28 % of commercialized patents have 
equivalents in at least 1 or 2 main areas, whereas corresponding fig-
ures for non-commercialized patents are 23 and 13 %. 
 
4. A model set up for to investigate 
international patenting 
The modeling set up presented below is the one developed by Eaton 
and Kortum (1996). Their model is a full fledged endogenous interna-
tional growth model in which international patenting plays important 
roles. In Eaton and Kortum’s model R&D in different countries im-
proves on the quality of input factors used in production processes 
domestically and in other countries. The degree to which an invention 
is used in other countries’ production processes depends on the proba-
bilistic size of the each invention and a probabilistic applicable pa-
rameter. If the invention is used in a country’s production process, the 
owner of the invention sells the technology monopolistically to the 
producer in that country. The owner of the invention faces a risk of 
imitation. This risk depends on whether or not the invention is patent-
ed. Eaton and Kortum develop the steady state growth paths in the 
model. This steady state is characterized by similar growth rates in all 
countries, but lower productivity in countries with low investments in 
R&D and little use of other countries’ technologies. The incentives to 
do R&D and to patent internationally depend on market size, protec-
tion of intellectual property rights and a set of other parameters.  
 
Given the scope of this paper, our set up is less ambitious and meant 
to provide a rough theory basis for our empirical specification of in-
ternational patenting. Our available data are microdata and this allows 
us to formulate patent owners’ choice about where to patent.  
 
The model is a quality ladder model of innovation á la Grossman and 
Helpman (1991). Output in each country is produced with the help of 
intermediates according to constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  
 
  vvv dXZ
1
0
lnlnY       )1  
 
Y denotes production, Xv the quantity of intermediate v and Zv its 
quality.  
 
Improvements in the quality of intermediates are the result of R&D 
and innovation.  Innovations improve the quality of an intermediate 
with a specific percentage amount, which is defined as the size of the 
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invention. The size of an invention is a random variable Q drawn from 
an exponential distribution.14 When an innovation is adopted to one 
intermediate Zv, the quality raises to Z’v defined as: 
 
v
q ZeZ v'       
 
The randomness of invention size makes the patenting decision heter-
ogeneous. Inventions that are large may be patented widely; inven-
tions that are small may only be patented in the home country of the 
owner.  
 
Producers of a newly innovated intermediate charge the highest possi-
ble price at which production without that innovated intermediate is 
unprofitable (Bertrand competition). Intermediates are produced under 
a simple production technology where one hour work is needed to 
produce one unit. The final good is numeraire so given a wage level, 
w,  the price charged by a firm producing the intermediate with the 
highest available quality, e
q
, is given by equation 2. This equation im-
plies limit pricing so that the leading firm in the market marginally 
undercuts the optimal price charged by the firm with next to highest 
quality. This firm’s price optimal equals w after the leader has entered 
the market.  The produced quantity for a firm producing the  interme-
diate v depends then on the demand function derived from eq. 1. This 
demand function is given by eq. 3.  
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Profits from an innovation of size q is therefore equal to: 
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Eq. 4 relates profitability of patenting to market size. This proves to be 
an important empirical regularity.15  
 
A patent reduces the probability that the innovation will be imitated in 
any period during the patents lifetime from k to zero. For simplicity 
we assume that patents last forever.16  
                                                 
14  The average step of an invention can be parameterised as 1/θ.  
15  For similar formulations of the above relationships, see Eaton and Kortum (1996) or 
Grossman and Helpman (1991a or 1991b, ch. 4).  
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The discounted values of an unpatented and patented innovation of 
quality q in country j originating in country i at time t are therefore:  
 
     
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Above, r denotes the discount rate and g the growth rate in the econo-
my. The value of patenting is the difference V(q)ijt
patent
-V(q)ijt
nopatent
. 
The inventor will seek patent protection if this difference exceeds the 
cost of patenting in country j at time t, Cjt. Therefore the equality  
 
    jt
nopatent
ijt
patent
ijt CqVqV         7)  
  
determines the threshold quality level q* such that innovations of 
higher quality are patented while those with lower qualities are not.17  
 
The threshold q* is given in eq. 8. The derivation of it is presented in 
the appendix.  
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It is seen from eq. 8 that the threshold value for q depends on patent 
costs, market size, interest rate, the growth rate and the risk of being 
imitated without patenting. The higher the threshold value the lower is 
the probability that an invention is patented in the particular market. 
The following results are easily derived:  
 
                                                 
16  It is easy to generalize to a reduction in imitation rates from any knopatent to any kpatent. 
Also, it is a simple task to introduce a statutory maximum lifetime for patents. This com-
plicates the derived empirical specifications without adding clarity. 
17  Note that the cost function, C, has subscripts jt. This indicates the country in which patent 
protection is applied for and the time when patent protection is applied for. It does not in-
dicate in which country the patent originate however. This reflects the requirement in 
most international patent treatments of national treatment, i.e. that foreign applicants shall 
treated similar to national applications.  
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Lemma 1.  
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These three results have the following characteristics:  
The first simply means that the higher the patenting costs, the higher 
is the threshold value for the quality of an innovation to be patented. 
Therefore, the higher the patenting costs in a country, the lower is the 
probability that an invention will be patented in that country. The se-
cond result means that the larger is the GDP in a country the lower is 
the threshold value for the quality of an innovation to be patented. 
Therefore, the probability that an invention will be patented will be 
increasing in the market size of a given country. The third result is 
similar for growth in total GDP.   
 
Generally, the quality of patented inventions has unknown distribu-
tions. If it is, for instance log normal, the log of returns will be normal. 
Many other distributions will be possible to analyze. A rough approx-
imation will be to analyze the binary choice (to patent or not) as   
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Above, PQjt denotes whether a patent of quality q is patented in coun-
try j or not. Note that the threshold value of the quality of an invention 
to be patentable is country specific. It depends on characteristics in the 
country where patent protection is sought. If we assume that a patent’s 
quality can be written as observable patent specific characteristics 
multiplied with a basic random variable so that for a patent k, 
qk=qh(xk), the probability that the owner of an invention k seeks pro-
tection in a country j can be written as 
 
    TQ jkjk fPQP  1      10)  
 
In eq. 10, T denotes a vector of characteristics of the country in which 
patent protection is sought while Q denotes a vector of characteristics 
of the patented  invention.  
5. Econometric analysis 
Our empirical strategy is to run probit regressions on variants of the 
above regressions. In our dataset with 867 observations we have 
dummy variables for whether a patent is applied for in any of the 36 
countries where patents are applied for. On the basis of this, we create 
an expanded dataset consisting of 867*36 (=31212) observations. That 
is, the observational unit is constructed to be the choice to apply for 
patent protection for patent k in country j.  We collect country specific 
data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011) . 
We lack data for Taiwan (for which there is one patent application). 
The dataset used in the regressions therefore consists of 35*867=30 
345 observations. 
 
The vector of country specific variables includes: 
 
 Total GDP. This is predicted by the above model. Total GDP 
reflects market size in the country in which protection is 
sought. We use GDP in 2000. 
 Growth in GDP in the period from 1995 to 2000. 
 Patent costs.  
 
It follows from the theoretical model (and intuition) that patent costs 
should be included as explanatory variable. This variable is not avail-
able for all countries. One reason for this is that costs of patenting de-
pend on several components. One is the filing costs. Very often (offi-
cial) translation of the patent documents is required. If so, this adds a 
new cost component. Often, patentees use patent agencies for han-
dling national patent offices. This also adds costs which may be di-
verse. Then renewal costs are added if the patent is granted.  In most 
countries such renewal costs are low but increasing with the age of the 
patent. In member countries in the European Patent Organization, pa-
tent protection can be sought in many countries via the European Pa-
tent Office. If so, the patent needs to be validated and (if granted) sub-
sequently renewed in each of member countries individually. But pa-
tents in Europe can also be obtained through patent applications to 
each of the individual countries. There is no patent cost index for all 
countries. We have therefore chosen to use the results from the survey 
by Helfgott (1993) where patent costs for a number of countries are 
presented. There are three problems with using this database. The first 
is that the survey is old. The patents covered by our database were 
granted in 1998. The patent equivalents that we are interested in were 
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therefore applied for by the late 1990s. The costs reported in Helfgott 
are therefore too low as compared to the costs faced by the applicants. 
Furthermore, we do not know whether they changed proportionally to 
each other or not. The second problem is that patent costs via EPO are 
reported. These should be added validation costs in individual coun-
tries to reflect the costs faced by the Swedish firms when applying for 
patent equivalents in other EPO member countries. We do not have 
access to these validation costs. We choose to include EPO as a single 
observation in versions of our regressions and leave EPO out in oth-
ers. The third problem with the use of the available cost data is that 
the overlap between countries in the Swedish patent database and 
those in Helfgott’s is limited. We have cost data for 23 of the 36 coun-
tries for which we have Swedish patent equivalents data (including 
EPO).18 We report separately results when cost data are included and 
when they were not included.  
 
The variables GDP, growth in GDP and patent costs follow directly 
from our modeling exercise. In addition we include in several specifi-
cations: 
 
 GDP per capita. It may be the case that a country’s GDP per 
capita reflects the technological level of this country and there-
fore a higher probability of being imitated. The a priori as-
sumption would be a positive effect.  
 Distance between Sweden and the country in which patent pro-
tection is sought. This variable should be included for two rea-
sons. First, trade is known to depend negatively with distance. 
Therefore the value of patenting will be lower in distant coun-
tries (less goods are exported there). But it may also be that 
distance indicates higher (non-formal) costs of patenting in the 
country in question. The inventor may have to travel there. 
Languages are different. Culture is different.  
 R&D intensity (as percent of GDP) reflects increased probabil-
ity of being imitated.  
 
The vector or patent specific variable vector includes variables from 
the database. These are: 
 
 Firm type. We have reasons to expect higher international pa-
tent propensities independently from patent quality from large 
firms due to credit constraints. This hypothesis follows from 
the results presented in table 1. The firm types are included in 
the regressions as dummy variables.  
                                                 
18  In the appendix we report the countries that are covered in the cost database and in the 
database for patent equivalents.  
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 Commercialization. The database contains information about 
whether the invention was commercialized. It is natural to as-
sume that commercialized patents will have a higher value so 
that they will be patented in more countries.  
 Patent survival is a clear and direct indicator of the quality of a 
patented invention. We include a dummy variable for whether 
the patent was still alive in 2004 and also the year for which it 
was first applied for.  
 Forward citations.  For our analysis patent citations are as-
sumed to reflect exogenous characteristics of the patent. Many 
studies indicate that forward patent citations reflect underlying 
private and social values of the patent. Higher private value 
would imply lower q and higher probability of patenting the 
invention in any market. Higher social values could imply 
stronger technological rivalry against the patented invention 
and therefore higher values of patenting. In this connection, 
the relationship between forward patent citations and interna-
tional patenting should a priori be expected to be strong. The 
value of patenting become stronger the higher the probability 
of being imitated is. Forward citations may reflect higher 
probability of imitation. In line with Maurseth (2005) we dis-
criminate between citations within and between technologies 
in order to trace possible different effects. We exclude self ci-
tations.  
 
One of our main hypotheses is that valuable patents will be patented to 
a higher degree than less valuable patents. Our empirical strategy is 
therefore to include as explanatory indicators of the value of patented 
inventions. The variables listed above are all candidates for being such 
indicators. They are therefore included in versions of the regressions, 
reported in table 6.  
 
However, we have reasons to believe that our data is characterized by 
endogeneity problems. If a patent proves valuable, it will probably 
both have higher probabilities of commercialization, it will be re-
newed for longer periods, receive more patent citations and have a 
higher probability of getting patent equivalents in any countries. It is 
not clear at the outset that causality runs from any of our right-hand 
value indicators to patent equivalents. In principle it might be that 
causation runs in both directions or from our dependent variable to-
wards to independent variable. We do not solve these endogeneity 
variables here. Rather, in table 5 therefore, we report results including 
the country specific variables and successively variables that reflect 
patents’ value with increasing problems (in our view) with endogenei-
ty.  
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Table 5. Probit regression results on patent equivalent.  
 
Variable       
lGDP 0.33 
(.000) 
0.33 
(.000) 
0.34 
(.000) 
0.35 
(.000) 
0.37 
(.000) 
0.36 
(.000) 
lGDPcap 0.25 
(.000) 
0.25 
(.000) 
0.26  
(.000) 
0.26 
(.000) 
0.28 
(.000) 
0.27 
(.000) 
ldistance -0.19 
(.000) 
-0.19 
(.000) 
-0.19 
(.000) 
-0.19 
(.000) 
-0.21 
(.000) 
-0.21 
(.000) 
Growth 4.19 
(.000) 
4.21 
(.000) 
4.26 
(.000) 
4.35 
(.000) 
4.57 
(.000) 
4.54 
(.000) 
L(RD/GDP) 0.09 
(.006) 
0.09 
(.008) 
0.10 
(.006) 
0.11 
(.003) 
0.11 
(.003) 
0.11 
(.003) 
101-1000 wo  0.24 
(.000) 
0.19 
(.000) 
0.01 
(.753) 
-0.03 
(.354) 
0.04 
(.268) 
11-100 wo  0.14 
(.000) 
0.07 
(.028) 
-0.03 
(.355) 
-0.05 
(.183) 
-0.03 
(.431) 
2-10 wo  0.24 
(.000) 
0.15 
(.000) 
0.08 
(.041) 
0.04 
(.333) 
0.06 
(.088) 
Comm.   0.51 
(.000) 
0.40 
(.000) 
0.37 
(.000) 
0.38 
(.000) 
Still alive    0.84 
(.000) 
0.81 
(.000) 
0.82 
(.000) 
Cites - within     0.19 
(.000) 
0.20 
(.000) 
Cites  - betw     0.48 
(.000) 
0.49 
(.013) 
Applic. date      0.58 
(.000) 
       
N 30345 30345 30345 30345 30345 30345 
Pseudo-R
2 
.17 .17 .19 .20 .25 .28 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent k in country 
j. Heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values in parentheses. For firm groups, firms 
without employees are reference group 
 
 
The first column report results when country specific variables only 
are included. That regressions lends support to our main hypothesis 
from the modeling exercise above. Market size (log of total GDP), 
welfare (log of GDP per capita in PPP), (log of) distance from Sweden 
and growth rates in total GDP all correlate positively with the proba-
bility of triggering a patent equivalent. So does (log of) R&D intensi-
ty.  
 
Market size (log of total GDP) has positive and highly significant im-
pacts on the probability of attracting patent equivalents. This means 
that large countries are the most likely to receive patent applications 
from Sweden. The same result holds for rich countries. This is harder 
to interpret, but since rich countries are the most technologically ad-
vanced we interpret this result as two sided: First, technologically ad-
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vanced countries may be those where probabilities of imitation are the 
largest. Thus intellectual property rights may be more profitable. Se-
cond, rich countries may have larger markets. Thus, the need for intel-
lectual property rights may be larger (since it may be more profitable 
to export to rich countries). The growth variable is growth in GDP per 
capita in the period from 1995 to 2000. We use this period since we 
expect it to reflect expected growth in the relevant market.  Also this 
variable has a positive and significant sign in line with out expecta-
tions.  
 
Geographical distance retards patent equivalents. The distance varia-
ble is geographical distance in kilometers based on the latitude and 
longitude of the countries’ capitals.19 Our interpretation is again two 
sided: First, distance is known to retard exports. Thus distant countries 
are, ceteris paribus¸ less important markets. Consequently, the need 
for intellectual property rights is less since the innovation may not be 
marketed in such markets. Second, it may be that distance in some 
way reflects the costs of dealing with a country. If patent costs also 
include cultural and linguistic costs, the negative and significant result 
may also reflect higher patenting costs. In future research we intend to 
include also formal patent costs as explanatory variable. This will 
qualify our interpretation also of the estimated coefficient of the dis-
tance variable.  
 
Note that the above results are in line with those of Harhoff et al. 
(2009). They estimate a gravity relationship for patenting among Eu-
ropean countries (and for other non-European patent applications in 
Europe). Harhoff and his co-authors find similar results for the aggre-
gate number of patent equivalents between these countries. They de-
pend positively on market size, negatively on distance and negatively 
on costs (see below). 
 
R&D intensity in the country where patent protection is sought has a 
positive and (mostly) significant sign. We expect R&D intensity to 
indicate higher imitation probabilities and therefore higher profitabil-
ity of patenting. The results are in accordance with this expectation.   
 
Column two, three, four, five, six and seven, successively introduce 
patent specific variables. The second column reports results from in-
clusion of indicators of firm size.  Firm size (in terms of employment) 
influences positively and significantly on the probability of equivalent 
patents. Firms without employment (and independent innovators) con-
stitute the reference group, so other types of firms have higher proba-
                                                 
19  EPO is located (with its headquarter and in our data) in Munich. We report results from 
regressions both when patent applications to EPO is included as one observation and for 
regressions where EPO membership is included as a country specific dummy variable.  
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bility of international patenting than these. Note that this effect is not 
increasing linearly with the number of employees. It is largest for the 
largest and for the smallest firms. In the third column a dummy for 
commercialization in Sweden is included. It is seen that also this vari-
ables correlates with the probability of international patenting. The 
result is as expected and it is highly significant. The endogeneity issue 
might be present however: It might be that commercialization (and 
therefore the existence of patent equivalents) contributes to national 
success in Sweden. We doubt that this effects is large and important. 
The next column is for additional inclusion of a dummy variable for 
whether the patent was renewed until the survey was undertaken 
(2003-04). Whether the patent had lapsed or not does also seem to be 
of importance. Patents still alive have higher tendencies to be applied 
for in other countries. 
  
Application date (year) also matters. The positive coefficient indicates 
that younger patents have more equivalents than older (application 
year ranges from 1985 to 1998). So does whether the patent was 
commercialized in Sweden. Also the number of forward citations mat-
ter. Note that citations both within and between technology classes 
matter. These technology classes are defined according to whether the 
cited and the citing patent belong to the same narrowly defined tech-
nology class (IPC number). In Maurseth (2005) it was found that pa-
tents that were cited by citing patents within the same technology 
class lapsed earlier. Such citations were therefore interpreted as rival 
patents that potentially may make the patent obsolete. In our context 
such rivalry should increase the profitability of patenting. The positive 
and significant coefficient is in line with this interpretation. Inter tech-
nology class citations may indicate high economic values of a patent. 
Such a patent may mark a scientific breakthrough and open up oppor-
tunities for further research. The positive and significant coefficient is 
in line with this interpretation. For our interpretations of the effect of 
citations one should note the above warning that there may also be 
spurious correlations and possibly endogeneity problems. In future 
research we intend to go deeper into this issue.  
 
Sweden is a member country in EPO. Furthermore, it is not clear that 
EPO can be included as one observation as we have done in table 5. In 
table 6 therefore, we report some results when EPO is taken out of the 
sample and when the other countries are characterized with the dum-
my variables EPO (EPO=0 for non-members and EPO=1 for mem-
bers). In table 6 we also report results from regressions where patent 
costs are included.  
 
The EPO dummy variable is positive and significant. This is reported 
in the first column in table 6. To some extent this indicates some suc-
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cess of the EPO. The Swedish patentees apply more often for patent 
protection in other EPO countries than in other countries. Such patents 
are automatically granted in other EPO countries when also granted in 
Sweden if the patentee pays validation fees and live up to prerequi-
sites for patenting in the other EPO countries. This finding gives sup-
port to the view that design of patent institutions matter. Interestingly, 
the other variables (mostly) keep their sign and significance when the 
EPO dummy variable is included.  
 
In the second and the third column we also introduce costs in the re-
gression. Note that this reduces the number of observations considera-
bly since we have access to patent costs for some countries only. 
Therefore, the coefficients for the other variables are not directly 
comparable when costs are included. Still, all keep their sign and most 
keep their significance when costs are included. The sign of the cost 
variables is (as expected) negative but it is not significant. Similar re-
sults were found by Harhoff et al. (2009). But in the third column we 
included both the EPO dummy variable and the cost variable. In this 
case the cost variable is not significant any longer, but the sign re-
mains.  
 
Our results for patent costs are fairly in line with our expectations 
even if the data are too old, too few and not properly take into account 
the case of EPO. Therefore, the results lend support to our prime pri-
ors about the impact of patent costs.  
 
Table 6. Probit regression results on patent equivalent.  
 
Variable    
lGDP 0.40 (.000)  0.43 (.000)  0.41 (.000)  
lGDPcap 0.20 (.000) 0.33 (.000) 0.42 (.000) 
ldistance -0.18 (.000) -0.28 (.000) -0.13 (.000) 
Growth 3.66 (.001) 0.49 (.816) 1.42 (.484) 
L(RD/GDP) 0.83 (.040) 0.02 (.737) 0.13 (.011) 
EPO 0.30 (.000)  0.38 (.000) 
Costs  -15 (.120) -0.037 (.710) 
101-1000 wo 0.41 (.301) 0.04 (.370) 0.042 (.351) 
11-100 wo -0.05 (.183) -0.03 (.515) -0.03 (.529) 
2-10 wo -0.04 (.307) 0.04 (.367) 0.04 (.351) 
Comm. 0.38 (.000) 0.36 (.000) 0.36 (.000) 
Still alive 0.80 (.000) 0.80 (.000) 0.81 (.000) 
Cites - within 0.18 (.002) 0.21 (.000) 0.22 (.000) 
Cites  - betw 0.46 (.002) 0.47 (.000) 0.47 (.000) 
N 29478 17340 17340 
Pseudo-R
2 
.27 .23 .24 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent k in country 
j. Heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values in parentheses. For firm groups, firms 
without employees are reference group. Note that the cost coefficient is multiplied 
with 1000. It was originally reported in USD.  
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The dataset consists of the patent dimension and the country dimen-
sion. Therefore the more than 30 000 observations are not independ-
ent. In principle the structure of the data is a panel. The cross section 
dimension is for the patents. The other dimension is for countries. In 
table 7 we reproduce the results from table 6 from a panel data regres-
sion. The results are fairly similar to those reported above. One differ-
ence is that patent costs are now negative and significant when the 
EPO dummy variable is left out.  
 
 
Table 7. Panel probit regression results on patent equivalent.  
 
Variable    
lGDP 0.70 (.000)  0.70 (.000)  0.68 (.000)  
lGDPcap 0.34 (.000) 0.52 (.000) 0.66 (.000) 
ldistance -0.30 (.000) -0.45 (.000) -0.24 (.000) 
Growth 5.83 (.001) 1.93 (.489) 3.39 (.223) 
L(RD/GDP) 0.10 (.040) 0.04 (.494) 0.19 (.003) 
EPO 0.41 (.000)  0.54 (.000) 
Costs  -0.26 (.046) -0.116 (.380) 
101-1000 wo 0.23 (.181) 0.23 (.200) 0.23 (.201) 
11-100 wo 0.11 (.500) 0.108 (.499) 0.11 (.493) 
2-10 wo 0.23 (.205) 0.29 (.122) 0.29 (.120) 
Comm. 0.69 (.000) 0.68 (.000) 0.69 (.000) 
Still alive 1.19 (.000) 1.19 (.000) 1.20 (.000) 
Cites - within 0.52 (.000) 0.53 (.000) 0.54 (.000) 
Cites  - betw 1.03 (.000) 1.05 (.000) 1.05 (.000) 
N 29478 17340 17340 
rho
 
0.66 .66 0.67 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent k in country 
j. Heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values in parentheses. For firm groups, firms 
without employees are reference group. Note that the cost coefficient is multiplied 
with 1000. It was originally reported in USD. 
 6. Summary and concluding remarks 
We have presented trends in international patenting based on a data-
base on Swedish patents and their international equivalents. We also 
modeled international patenting as the result of a strategy where gains 
and costs were traded off against each other. The model predicts that 
equivalents depend on market size, growth, patent costs and patent 
specific variables. Our empirical results indicate important variables 
that explain international patenting. First, more valuable patents have 
more equivalents. Second, variables that indicate technological inter-
action are important. Patent citations indicate possible links between 
the original patent and subsequent external technological activities. In 
the literature citations are used both as indicators of technological ri-
valry and as indicators of private and social values of the cited patents. 
This is in line with our findings about the effect of patent citations 
(both within technologies and between technologies).  
 
Also the country specific variables have estimates in line with expec-
tations. Market size, GDP per capita, growth and distance have coeffi-
cients with expected signs and significance. Also R&D intensity is 
positive and significant in line with our expectations.  Patent costs in-
fluence negatively as expected, but (probably) due to data quality, the 
significance of the estimated coefficient is fragile.  
 
In future work we intend to extend the study. We intend to use infor-
mation about technology classes in the database. Since patenting is 
known to vary much between industries (Levin et al, 1987), we expect 
this to be important. Second, we will include overlap in R&D and in 
industrial specialization between Sweden and the country in question 
in order to better reflect the probability that an invention will be mar-
keted and that it will imitated.  
 
Appendix – about the data 
 
Country EPO member in 1998 Costs available 
Austria 1 Yes 
Australia 0 Yes 
Belgium 1 No 
Bulgaria 0 No 
Brazil 0 Yes 
Canada 0 Yes 
Switzerland 1 Yes 
China 0 No 
Cyprus 1 No 
Czech Republic 0 No 
Germany 1 Yes 
Denmark 1 Yes 
Estonia 0 No 
EPO | Yes 
Spain 1 Yes 
Finland 1 Yes 
France 1 Yes 
United Kingdom 1 Yes 
Greece 1 Yes 
Hong Kong 0 No 
Hungary 0 No 
Ireland 1 No 
Italy 1 Yes 
Japan 0 Yes 
Korea, Rep. 0 Yes 
Luxembourg 1 Yes 
Monaco 0 No 
Netherlands 1 Yes 
Norway 0 Yes 
New Zealand 0 Yes 
Poland 0 No 
Portugal 1 No 
Romania 0 No 
Russian  0 No 
Taiwan 0 Yes 
United States 0 Yes 
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Appendix. Derivation of eq. 8 
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